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之间的利益问题，同时对公司未来的发展也会有一定的影响。自 Miller and 
Modigliani 在“完美资本市场”的假设上提出了“股利无关论”之后，很多学者
通过放宽假设条件，对股利政策的实证和理论研究加以丰富。 
2006 年，De Angelo 等学者结合投资机会和代理成本提出了股利政策的生命
周期理论，并且验证了美国资本市场上的上市公司股利支付倾向符合股利政策的
生命周期理论。2008 年，Denis 和 Osobov 也验证了加拿大、英国、德国、法国、















































Listed companies’ dividend policy is not only related to the benefits between the 
shareholders and managers, shareholders and debtors, but also related to the interests 
between the large shareholders and the external atomistic investors. And meanwhile, 
it may also have a certain impact on the company’s future developments.  Miner and 
Modigliani’s theory which is said that the company’s valuation is irrelevance of 
dividend policy but is just related to the incomes of investments is based on series 
assumptions of the perfect capital markets. From then on, many scholars start to pay 
attention to the dividend policy by relaxing the assumptions MM concerned, and 
constantly do the empirical researches to rich the theories of dividend policy. 
In 2006，De Angelo et al. proposed the life cycle theory of dividend policy 
combining of investment opportunities and agency problem. Their research verifies 
that the listed companies in U.S. capital market pay dividends according with the life 
cycle theory of dividend policy. In 2008, Denis and Osobov also verified that the 
companies in Canada, Britain, Germany, France, Japan these five countries pay 
dividends consistent with their life cycles. 
Contrasting to other developed countries of the world capital markets, such as 
the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan and other mature markets, China's capital 
market is still facing many problems and challenges. Weather the relationship 
between the company’s dividend payout ratio and the company’s life cycle is 
consistent with the life cycle theory of dividend policy or not. Then identify the 
possibly important reasons that cause the anomalies. According to our analysis and 
giving our suggestions can conduct the governance of listed companies, and even 
simulate the developments of our capital market. 
This paper is based on the dividend policy of the life cycle theory, and analyses 
from different plate, different life cycle stages and different actual control’s nature to 
the test weather the dividend payment rate and the company’s life cycle is consistant 
with the life cycle theory of dividend policy. The average dividend payout ratio of  















interpretations from the visions of the company’s agency problems between the large 
shareholders and the external atomistic investors and the large shareholders’ control 
benefits with Chinese special backgrounds . 
This paper finds that the Chinese listed companies’ dividend payout ratio can’t 
be interpreted by the dividend policy of the life cycle theory, which displays a special 
vision against the life cycle theory. The more dividends the company pays, the 
younger the company is. This paper is based on the principal-agency problem to 
analysis the reason of the special vision by the perspective of the controlling 
shareholders. The study finds that under the pyramids and cross-shareholdings 
structure of Chinese listed companies, controlling shareholders will weigh their 
controlling benefits between the private benefits and the sharing interests, for their 
own controlling interests as more as possible without considering the interests of 
external atomistic shareholders, may be the one reason to explain the special vision. 
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